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discussion was a decision to increase pres-
of a series of enlarged meetings of the Chi-
tion by the Central Committee of the Chi-
sure on Mao to extract an unequivocal com-
nese Communist Party Central Committee
nese Communist Party; in the meantime, he
mitment from China to enter the war.
(CCP CC) Politburo in Beijing to formulate
was ready to send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao
Thus, it appears that as a result of cumu-
the Chinese response. New documents from
to Stalin’s vacation home for direct consul-
lative discussions and a series of incremen-
the Russian Presidential Archive suggest
tations. In conveying Mao’s telegram, which
tal decisions dated September 27, Septem-
that at their first meeting the CCP CC Polit-
was dated October 2, an obviously shocked
ber 30, and October 5, the Soviet Politburo
buro members discussed general reasons
Roshchin noted that this new position flatly
adopted a major policy shift in the Soviet
why the PRC should or should not enter the
contradicted repeated assurances from Chi-
policy toward Korea. The Soviet leadership
war in Korea and decided that the risks
nese leaders that the People’s Liberation
appears to have decided to begin to limit
outweighed the benefits of China’s direct
Army was ready, indeed, in high “fighting
Soviet military and political exposure in
military intervention at that time. Zhou
spirit,” to aid the Koreans and to defeat the
Korea, and at the same time permit a greater
Enlai and Lin Biao’s negative position pre-
Americans. The Soviet envoy could only
Chinese role in the alliance decision-making
vailed, and Mao felt obliged to inform Stalin
speculate on the reasons for the turnabout in
on Korea.
of the Chinese hesitations and lack of deci-
the Beijing leadership’s stand: the interna-
In this light, given the continuous dete-
sion.
tional situation, the “worsening” predica-
rioration of the military situation in Korea,
On October 3, the Soviet ambassador in
ment in Korea, and/or Anglo-American “in-
as well as the Soviet leaders’ determination
Beijing, Roshchin, relayed Mao Zedong’s
trigues” through the intercession of Indian
to see Chinese, not Soviet, troops fighting
negative response. [See Document #12.]
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (It is
there, the Politburo overruled the Foreign
Replying to Stalin’s October 1 entreaty to
important to note that this account of Mao’s
Ministry’s objections and decided, as one of
enter the war, Mao acknowledged that the
October 2 communication to Stalin, inform-
the first steps aimed at curtailing the Soviet
Chinese leadership had “originally planned”
ing him of Chinese refusal to enter the war,
presence in Korea, to grant Ambassador
to send “several volunteer divisions” to as-
based on newly-declassified documents int
Shtykov the evacuation powers that he re-
sist the “Korean comrades” once the enemy
he Russian archives, fundamentally contra-
quested with respect to some Soviet special-
crossed the 38th parallel. However, he ex-
dicts the purported Mao to Stalin message of
ists employed by the DPRK government and
101 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
by Soviet organizations in Korea [Politburo
but it would not be able to get back even
5] letter and stated that he would send nine,
Decision No. P78/168, Document #14]. He
Taiwan, which at that time the United States
not six, divisions to Korea, but that he would
was notified of this policy change by wire
was clinging to; not for the benefit of Nation-
not do it right away; instead, he intended to
the same day. Ironically, the permission
alist Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang
do it some time soon. In the meantime, he
arrived just as Shtykov, sensing a policy
Kai-shek), in Stalin’s view, but to use the
asked me to receive his representatives and
shift in Moscow, losing all his faith in Kim
island as its own strategic base or for a
discuss with them a plan of military assis-
Il Sung’s ability to defend his regime on his
militaristic Japan of tomorrow.
tance to Korea in detail” [see Document
own, and unsure if any help was coming
In conclusion, Stalin displayed a singu-
#13]. Evidently, Mao’s October 7 telegram
from Moscow or Beijing, requested even
larly unusual propensity for high-stakes gam-
contained only his conditional consent to
more extended evacuation powers, now in-
bling which was fraught with the potential
send troops to Korea. He had taken a step
cluding the families of the Soviet citizens of
for global disaster. He reassured Mao that he
toward Stalin’s position but hinted that, once
Korean nationality,32 the personnel of the
had taken into account the possibility that the
again, the decision was not yet final, and
Soviet Air Force units stationed in Korea,33
United States, albeit unready to fight a major
could be rendered final only after Stalin
and all other Soviet citizens in Korea [Docu-
war then, could still be drawn into a big war
received in person and succeeded in per-
ment #16]. It took less than a day for
(i.e., with China) on a question of prestige,
suading the chief CCP CC Politburo oppo-
Vasilevsky and Gromyko to get Stalin’s
which, in turn, would drag the USSR, which
nents of China’s entry into the Korean War:
approval and immediately wire the affirma-
was bound with China by a Mutual Assis-
Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Stalin accepted
tive response.
tance Pact, into the war. Stalin asked Mao:
Mao’s request with understanding, realizing
After the conference with his Politburo
“Should we be afraid of this possibility? In
that he had to bolster Mao if he wanted the
associates sometime during the day of Octo-
my opinion, we should not, because, to-
latter to deliver.
ber 5, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Mao
gether, we will be stronger than the United
While Moscow and Beijing bickered
and Zhou [Document #13]. Without men-
States and Great Britain, whereas none of the
about why, when, on what terms, and whether
tioning the latest policy shift in Moscow, he
other European capitalist states (with the
troops should be sent to defend Kim Il Sung’s
outlined his reasoning why it was in China’s
exception of Germany, which is unable to
crumbling regime—and whose troops they
national interest to dispatch the Chinese
provide any assistance to the United States
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