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[Table of Contents]
Revised from Kane notes up to the point marked. This chapter is accompanied by
another on the subject by Dr. Kane.
Of all the technologies since World War II, the one which epitomizes a
strategy of technology is the silent war in developing nuclear technology. The
U.S. pursuit and application of this postwar
breakthrough is science and development has followed two paths.
In one the U.S. excelled and still excels; in the other the U.S. consistently
demonstrated its failure to apply its innovative skills to national strategy.
In this chapter we deal with the
technology first, then relate it to the issue of strategy.
Throughout the period there are two major themes: fear of nuclear technology,
and the development of weapons for deterrence.
The reasons for fearing nuclear technology are obvious. Nuclear weapons have
sufficient power
to destroy a great part of the Earth's population and wealth in a short time.
It is also well to remember why the U.S. places so much emphasis on nuclear
technology for deterrence. In the late 1940's and early 1950's it became clear
that the U.S. had no choice but to
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erect a defensive perimeter to assure its freedom and that of its allies in
Europe and Asia. Major
studies were conducted to examine two alternatives: dependence on conventional
technology (a study that lasted three years), or dependence on nuclear
weapons.
The cost tradeoffs clearly favored dependence on the nuclear deterrent.
Matching the Soviets in
size of forces while depending on a semi-mobilized economy was clearly not
acceptable because of both the cost and political factors: the U.S. population
was unlikely to endure more years of mobilization.
The U.S. began research, development, and acquisition of nuclear weapons to
deter central war and for battlefield deployment to deter war in Europe and
Asia. However, though these actions
were deemed essential, the rate and timing were episodic, determined more by
Soviet initiatives than by deliberate U.S. planned application to a long-term
strategy.
Strategy reflects a struggle between decision centers.
The U.S. goal has been to preserve the status quo through a defensive strategy
which is based on offensive forces. These forces and the nation itself have
been (and in 1989 remain) essentially
undefended. Meanwhile the Soviets continually tried to preserve the initiative
and freedom of
action. Their strategy has two aspects: a dynamic technological effort to try
to match the episodic
advances of the U.S. and a diplomatic/propaganda effort to constrain and delay
U.S. technology by confusing the U.S. decision process, generally by invoking
fears of global annihilation.
Foreword: 1988
[Table of Contents]
There have been many advances in nuclear technology since this chapter was
written. Given the
dynamism of the field it would be surprising if there had not been.
In 1969 our analysis of nuclear technology focussed on lost opportunities. We
did not have a
broad strategy for exploiting all the potential applications of nuclear
technology.
We did, however, have a nuclear strategy. It has been in operation since
somewhat before the
first edition, and continues to this day. The strategy is very narrow; but
very, very successful.
The objective has been continuously to improve our weapons in spite of all
constraints. The
weapon technology goes hand in hand with the inertial guidance technology. As
accuracy has
gotten better and better, yield has gone down, and weapon effects have gone
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up. Furthermore,
our weapons are longer-lived, have become more reliable, and have been very
economical in the use of critical nuclear material.
As we have decreased yield without giving up military (and even improving)
military effectiveness we have reduced the amount of critical material in each
weapon. Thus, we are able
to "mine" obsolete weapons for their nuclear material and re-use it for newer,
more efficient designs.
That strategy, narrow as it is, can only be called an unqualified success.
The Applications Effort
[Table of Contents]
In the fifty years since Nils Bohr announced the splitting of the atom,
nuclear technology has grown and matured -- and become the most controversial
technology in history. As we approach
the end of the century, the issue is whether or not nuclear technology will
continue to be constrained from its full potential. In the immediate post-war
period several landmark studies (as
for example the Lexington Report) identified applications to an array of
military and civil applications
(See Chart 17)
. Most of them were explored. But at the same time there was a
raging discussion of ways to limit those applications or to "put the nuclear
genie" back in the bottle. That situation still prevails at the start of the
last decade of this century -- new
applications are being invented; new attempts are being made to prevent them.
The list of military applications explored covers nearly the entire range of
propulsion and
weapon systems.
In the initial period the focus was on nuclear weapons design and production.
Two major designs
were pursued: Implosion and insertion. The objectives in weapon design were
efficiency and
safety. As for efficiency, there were two major objectives: improving the
yield to weight ratio
and decreasing the amount of critical material used. Safety aspects
concentrated on the bombs
themselves, including extension of life of the weapons, and maintenance of
reliability. During
this period also, an entirely new weapon was designed -- the hydrogen or "H"
bomb.
Principally under the influence of the ICBM program, design shifted from
weapon development and production to that of weapon systems. The marriage of a
small weapon with a rocket booster
led the way to an integrated approach. The first major product was the MIRV'ed
ICBM, but
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others were found in the SLBM, field artillery, and tactical fighter delivered
weapons.
Beginning at about the same time, other technologies, principally electronics,
began to play a major role in nuclear weapons. The internal guidance system of
the Post-Boost Vehicle which
carries the MIRV's greatly improved the accuracy of weapon delivery. That
technological
innovation meant that the yield of the individual weapon could be reduced
while still maintaining weapon effectiveness as measured by SSPK (Single-Shot
Probability of Kill).
(Footnote 4)
Another important application of electronics came from the political
requirement for absolute control of each weapon. The concern was that
aircraft-carried weapons could be employed by the
aircraft crew on their command. Thus, inadvertent, accidental, or deliberate
but unauthorized
release could occur and nuclear war could result. Consequently, Permissive
Action Links
(PAL's) were designed and installed on nuclear weapons. For ICBM's in their
silo's, a "turn-key"
system was installed so that no one crew member could launch a missile,
because two members would have to "turn their keys" in a prescribed sequence
and on receipt of a coded message in order for ICBM launch to occur.
Implementation of the INF will remove the newest, most effective nuclear
weapons from the
U.S. stockpile. This is a reversal of prior treaties which resulted in or
permitted removal of older,
less efficient weapons while retaining the most modern ones. One of the
effects of the INF is
thus to increase the average age of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
In the decade of the 1990's, nuclear weapon technology will see a new phase --
transformation to
"wizard" weapons. During the war in Viet Nam advanced guidance technology,
notably lasers,
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